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ABSTRACT

SHOCK, STIMULUS, & UPHEAVAL:
THE GREAT RECESSION, THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT,
AND MAYORAL COALITIONS IN BROOKLYN, NY 2009-2013

by

CHARLES W. LINSMEIER

Advisor: John Mollenkopf

In 2009, the United States, and much of the world, experienced the largest economic
decline since the Great Depression of the early 20th Century. New York City, the financial
capital of the United States, was not immune. In early 2009, the federal government passed
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) shepherding a substantial
infusion of federal funds to states and municipalities to stimulate local economies and stem
the tide of potential job losses. At the same time, New York City was experiencing an
historic mayoral election - the potential third term of Mayor Michael Bloomberg - made
possible only by an eleventh hour vote by the City Council to extend term limits for the city
council and mayor’s office beyond the two-term limit established by public referendum.
In 2009, these two historic events collided, a mayor seeking to maintain his political
coalition under threat, and the allocation of a large influx of federal funds across the city.
This study examines how federal funding available from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act was allocated with respect to the forging of political coalitions during the
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mayoral election of 2009. Specifically, it focuses on the hotly-contested borough of Brooklyn
and investigates the potential for political maneuvering of federal funds towards key
constituencies within the dominant political coalition. The study looks not only at the 2009
election year, but explores changes in the pattern of federal funding as political coalitions
shifted in Brooklyn during the third term of the Bloomberg administration, contributing to
the 2013 election of the first Democratic mayor in New York City in twenty years.
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Overview

In early 2009, the federal government passed the American Recovery &
Reinvestment Act (ARRA): legislation designed to stimulate the nation’s economy during the
largest economic recession in nearly a century. The collapse of national and international
global financial institutions predicated by the failure of the mortgage-lending industry
resulted in a freefall in local tax revenue, the removal of credit sources for municipalities
and private loan-seekers, and a dramatic fall in consumer confidence. For a period of
months, the most powerful economy was at a standstill including many sectors threatened
to the point of permanent stagnation. The financial sector, once the prize of the U.S.
economy, and many manufacturing sectors, including the long-suffering auto industry,
turned to the federal government for a bailout. At the same time, the new Obama
administration attempted to revitalize local economies by passing stimulus legislation in
support of small business owners, local municipalities and state governments, and private
sector industry most threatened by the collapse.
Communities across the United States were suffering: Midwestern cities like Detroit,
Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee saw the bottom fall out of a manufacturing industry already in
rapid decline; Western cities like Denver, Las Vegas, and Phoenix suffered greatest from the
housing collapse with foreclosures at the highest rates in the country, each having long
supported city growth on the back of the housing boom. New York City, the geographical
epicenter of the financial sector, witnessed unforeseen shortfalls in revenue from the
financial industry and a shutter of investment in the city. Large scale projects ceased to be
explored, or were indefinitely halted, and foreclosure rates increased in a city whose
principle builders and owners operate multi-family homes. Other shortfalls in the funding of
health care and health services also threatened embattled neighborhoods in the city’s
boroughs.

In the same year, New York City residents went to the polls to elect candidates to
the citywide offices of mayor, comptroller, and public advocate. The City Council was also
up for reelection. In late October of 2008, as the early experiences of the Recession were
taking hold, the City Council passed 29 to 22 – and the sitting mayor, Michael Bloomberg,
signed – new legislation extending the city council and mayor’s term limits to three 4-year
terms in office. The contentious move was largely viewed by opponents as a purely
politically maneuver to circumvent the rights of the city’s residents to determine local
limitations of power; indeed, on two separate occasions the city’s residents had voted in
citywide referendums to limit the terms of city officials to two.
The term-limit legislation instantaneously changed the political dynamics in the
upcoming election with the popular mayor Michael Bloomberg, a Manhattan Democratturned-Republican-turned-Independent now running for a third term. Over the coming
months, a number of high-profile challengers removed themselves from the race, and
William Thompson, the city’s serving comptroller, emerged as the Democratic nominee. In
addition to the citywide races, city council seats held by council members who had voted for
the extension of term-limits came under fire with a series of primary challenges.
This tumultuous debate around the extension of the city’s term limits, against the
backdrop of the economic recession, developed from an evolution of urban power in political
and economic forces in New York City that dated back to the late 1970s with the first
electoral victory by Edward Koch. The rise of the Koch administration served as the first
instance of the post-industrial regime taking power in New York City, a regime of influence
and electoral success that stretched over three decades and 28+ years of mayoral control.
The success of the “pro-growth, post-industrial,” regime of white ethnics from Brooklyn,
Queens, and Staten Island aligned with the Manhattan small business and corporate
interests produced a winning and largely internally consistent regime of influence in the city
(Mollenkopf, 1994). This regime faced off election after election against the community-
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based Democratic organizations that once dominated city politics but appeared everfractured by ethnic heterogeneity, class differences, and political infighting.
Following ARRA money in the context of the 2009 election provides a novel view into
the dynamics of urban regime politics. As Irene Rubin writes in The Politics of Public
Budgeting, “public budgeting is not only a technical process, it is also necessarily and
appropriately political.” Budgets reflect choices about what governments will and will not
do; they reflect priorities. And, ultimately, “budgetary decision-making provides a picture of
the relative power of budget actors within and between branches of government as well as
of the importance of citizens, interest groups, and political parties” (Rubin, 2019). Through
federal documentation of released funds, ARRA money can be tracked to the various urban
constituencies that form the competing political interests in the city. All constituencies could
compete for ARRA funding, but the type of funding, the direction of funding towards certain
constituencies, and the role of that funding within communities plays into the broader
themes of urban regime politics in New York City, particularly in the borough of Brooklyn.
The following analysis of these funding trends maps over the urban constituencies that
formed behind the mayor’s and the Democratic Party’s efforts to create constituencies large
enough to win contested elections.
ARRA funding provides a particularly useful measure of political and policy dynamics
because the federal stimulus was unanticipated as part of the original FY 2010 estimates by
the Mayor or Comptroller’s Office. In addition, the total “federal stimulus” from the Obama
administration was unprecedented in recent times, in terms of its overall funding levels,
$787 billion, and its focus on filling the coffers of state and local budgets swamped during
the Recession, and replacing drops in private investment with a one-time injection of public
investment in “shovel-ready” projects. The effect on New York City was not small. The
FY2010 budget summary by Comptroller William Thompson in 2009 estimated total
revenues for NYC of $61.211 billion with an estimated $5.313 billion coming from federal
sources (8.7%). After the influx of funding from the federal government through ARRA and
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other sources, the FY2010 budget was later confirmed at $63.080 billion with an estimated
$7.943 billion (12.6%) coming from the federal government, a 49.5% increase in federal
funding (Thompson, 2008; Liu, 2010; Stringer, 2017). An analysis of the allocation and
disbursement of federal funding that exceeded projections by $2.63 billion provides a
unique opportunity to see how politics and political coalitions influence or fail to influence
the opportunities to shelter federal funds that support their political constituencies.
This paper will attempt to answer four questions around the use of federal funds in
Brooklyn from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and its relationship to political
events occurring in the upheaval from a mayoral election on the eve of the largest recession
since the Great Depression, and at a unique political moment in a generation of New York
City politics. The questions this study seeks to answer: (1) What businesses, organizations,
or individuals received federal stimulus funds as part of ARRA? (2) Were those recipients
unique to funding from ARRA or were they recipients of discretionary funding from the City
of New York in years after the distribution of ARRA funds? (3) Were the recipients of funds
from ARRA aligned to political coalitions that reelected the mayor in a tight 2009 reelection
bid? (4) To what degree can we determine measures of success for the ARRA
implementation in Brooklyn against the original policy goals announced as part of the ARRA
legislation?

Review of ARRA 2009 program goals and research literature

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) has been a focus of research
ever since the bill passed and was signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009, just
weeks into his administration. The bill, when passed, introduced a stimulus of approximately
$787 billion to support federal, state, and local initiatives to stimulate the economy. As
noted by Hall & Jennings (2010), “the act was heralded as a direct response to the ongoing
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and deepening economic crisis. ARRA had three primary goals (originally from
recovery.gov):

1. Create new jobs and save existing ones
2. Spur economic activity and invest in long-term growth
3. Foster unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in government
spending.

Though accountability and transparency were a key objective, as originally reported on
recovery.gov, ARRA included several additional goals that were not as effectively reported
or tracked. The act states five general purposes:

1. To preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery.
2. To assist those most affected by the recession.
3. To provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency by spurring
technological advances in science and health.
4. To invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that
will provide long-term economic benefits.
5. To stabilize state and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid
reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax increases.

Up until the future demise of the recovery.gov website, the data made available on
recovery.gov considered only the first of these purposes and excluded the remaining four
(Hall & Jennings, 2010). Much of the state and local budget support was not tracked
effectively, despite it representing one-third of the total ARRA spending. Nonetheless,
recovery.gov and its successor USAspending.gov, provide insight into payments to
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individuals, businesses, and organizations throughout the United States, including loan and
grant information on every recipient.
Despite the efforts at transparency, the distribution of ARRA funds faced other
constraints, both operational and structural. Research has demonstrated that the ARRA
funding faced implementation challenges, specifically with regards to staff capacity, legal
constraints, wage requirements, transparency requirements, and shovel-ready status
(Carley & Hyman, 2014). Nancy Johnson (2009) surveyed local administrators uncovering
“the reality has been that most of the funds are being transmitted through preexisting
federal programs that have a minimal effect on the day-to-day services provided by cities.
As such, cities have shifted their ARRA funding strategies away from seeking funds for a
prioritized list of needs to applying for any grant for which they might be deemed eligible.”
Since its implementation, researchers have looked at the role of politics in the
distribution of federal funds under ARRA and the potential of influence from political
coalitions aligned with the parties in power. John Kingdon famously noted that policy
happens at a particular moment in time under the confluence of three conditions: a problem
widely perceived by the public, the existence of ready-at-hand policy or sets of policies and,
finally, a favorable political environment (Kingdon, 1995). The financial crisis of 2008
provided the economic and political catalyst for parties in power to distribute an
unprecedented amount of federal funds to recipients across the country. The question then
to ask: Did they?
Political coalition theory suggests that existent coalitions at the confluence of events
recognized by Kingdon’s thesis have distributive power to support their coalition or weaken
their opponents. As noted by Mollenkopf (1989), “urban governments have powers and
interests of their own, not fully subordinate to economic interests, and proposes that the
concept of a “dominant political coalition” offers the best way to understand how urban
political orders are developed, sustained, and at times undermined or overturned. Dominant
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coalitions achieve the ability to direct governmental power on an ongoing basis over a range
of issues.”
Nonetheless, research on whether distribution of ARRA funds were political motivated
are inconclusive. At the national level, there were indications that the allocation process was
unaltered, as one study noted, “By all accounts, ARRA’s implementation by the CDFI
(Community Development Financial Institutions) Fund was uneventful. Federal managers
worked diligently to allocate the additional tax credit authority to the community
development entities (CDEs) eligible to receive tax credit allocations under the program”
(Benjamin, 2017; Conlan, 2017). Yet, as funds gated for distribution at the state and local
level moved forward, early signs of political maneuvering entered the fray, “States with
Republican governors were nearly 60% less likely to certify the ARRA on a given day than
states with Democratic governors.” Or, perhaps not unexpectedly, “When economic
constraints and policy design foreclose actual rejection of a federal law, state policymakers
may rely on party labels to register their approbation or disapprobation through other
means, including the amount of time taken to accept federal funding” (Miller, 2012).
Political procrastination was not the only tool in the allocation process, “although seemingly
universalistic, the distribution of funds under ARRA was not flat, and some counties received
substantially more than others. One [alternative] theory, is that geographic distribution may
be driven by policy window effects, particularly for sweeping policies like ARRA. A reason
that ARRA did not direct resources toward the hardest-hit areas may be that the legislation
became a vehicle for a broad array of other policy goals as political entrepreneurs took
advantage of an especially wide-open window of opportunity” (Gimpel, 2012). Furthering
that perception, “there does appear to be a distinct tilt toward counties that were stronger
for the Democratic Party in 2008. All else equal, counties at the 90th percentile of
Democratic share presidential vote ‘08 received between $35 and $36 more per capita in
both total funding and infrastructure projects than did counties in the 10th percentile.”
However, as noted by Boone (2014), “this differential is at least partly driven by a small
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number of very dense urban districts with high levels of employment -- and the differential
is smaller when the stimulus award was measured per worker in the district. Democratic
districts did receive modestly greater funds, but this is largely due to higher levels of
funding going to places with more generous state welfare programs.”
As a point of study, the distribution of ARRA funds provided a unique glimpse into
the effect of fiscal policy initiatives during a time of crisis. Recovery.gov provided
transparency into the primary goal of the federal stimulus - to save jobs and create new
ones - and allows for tracking at not only the city level, but to the neighborhood. And
research has shown that the overall number of jobs created or saved and the multiplier
effect from dollars expended nears if not exceeds two million jobs. Two government
agencies and a third party verification suggest that total nonfarm sector jobs saved varies
from 1.3 million to 2.8 million by the Congressional Budget Office to 2.2 million to 2.6
million by the Council for Economic Advisors and an alternative methodology settles on 2.0
million in 2010 and 3.4 million by early 2011, resulting in eight jobs per $1 million spent, or
$125,000 per job (Wilson, 2012).
Together, the existing literature on the effectiveness of the allocation and distribution
of federal funds under ARRA have focused on national political coalitions and the
effectiveness of public policy exercised on a grand scale. But the opportunity that the
tracking of recipients of ARRA funds through recovery.gov allows for a more granular review
of ARRA funds at the urban level, the distribution of funds as they relate to local political
coalitions, and the persistence of funding to those recipients.

Methods

The method of study is a descriptive analysis of federal funding in Brooklyn from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 as originally tracked through the
Recovery.gov site (Recovery, 2009) established by the federal government during the
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allocation period of federal stimulus dollars to states and municipalities. Recovery.gov
provided specific information on the types of grants or loans from the federal government to
businesses and organizations operating in Brooklyn, which can further be identified by their
associated Assembly District. Areas of specific interest are loans from the Small Business
Administration; grants from the Energy and Education departments; and grants from
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Health and Human Services (HHS)
departments.
The funds allocated by ARRA to Brooklyn entities are then mapped against the
Assembly Districts, the smallest consistent measure of party voting that is tracked by the
Department of Elections of New York City. The assembly districts can then be identified by
pro-Mayor votes in 2009 as a relative change from 2005 to help indicate the drop-off in
mayoral political support from the decision to extend term limits in October 2008. It also
provides a baseline for coalitions that supported the reelection of Mayor Bloomberg in 2005
and again in 2009, based on party politics, ethnic motivations, and other factors as
identified in the regime politics literature. From there, the study provides a descriptive
analysis of the allocation of federal funds from ARRA to certain individuals, businesses, and
organizations within established areas of the electoral coalition for the mayor in 2009.
The study will compare those findings to the more recent electoral coalitions of
Democratic mayoral candidate Bill de Blasio in the Democratic primary and general election
in 2013. The shift in party politics from 2009 to 2013 demonstrates the emergence of
different electoral coalitions than had been experienced by the city in the run of Republicanelected officials from 1993 to 2013. It will also allow for an analysis of general funding from
the federal government and its allocations by assembly district to see if any anomalies
emerged from the unexpected and unprecedented allocation of federal funds to the city
during the Great Recession as part of the federal stimulus package of 2009.
Further, the paper will review the recipients of federal funds in Brooklyn as
distributed through programs allocated from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
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and compare them against recipients of discretionary funds from the City of New York in
2009-2013. This comparison will help to identify the type and magnitude of investment in
projects that might be deemed as “shovel ready” or otherwise unfunded except in the
instance that the events of the Great Recession provided. In addition, the comparison will
expose the prevalence of funding that was directed to businesses, organizations, or
individuals that received funding from the discretionary budget in years to come. Finally, by
tracking these funding instances against New York State assembly district, it can be
determined if there is any correlation between funding and geographic political support.

Recent history of political coalitions in New York (1993 to 2009)

Over its history, New York City has seen the rise and tempering of political influences that
drove electioneering and the establishment of strong political parties within the city
(Mollenkopf, 1994; Strom & Mollenkopf, 2006). Unlike other major urban centers in the
United States, New York City has experienced an unprecedented run of Republican
candidates that dominated the mayor’s office from 1993 to 2013, first with two-term mayor
Rudolph Giuliani from 1993-2001, and then with Michael Bloomberg from 2001-2013, being
one of only four mayors to serve twelve years (LaGuardia, Wagner, Koch), and the first
since referendums put before New York City residents limited terms of mayors to two (and
which were quickly reestablished after his second reelection).
The political coalitions that allowed Republican candidates to win in a city with
registered Democrats outnumbering registered Republicans by as much as 7 to 1 is a study
in electoral coalition building. The fracturing of the Democratic party coalitions across racial
and economic lines as well as regional influences within the geographies managed by
political machines in each borough help to understand the influences that led voters to elect
and reelect candidates counter to the distribution of party representation that dominated
the City Council and Assembly Districts within the city.
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At the heart of political coalition building in New York City is its immigrant history
and immigrant and ethnic political representation and mobilization. New York City has
always been “a segmented political system, organized for mobilization around ethnic group
lines, and a political culture that sanctions, indeed encourages, newcomers to engage in
ethnic politics” (Waldinger, 1996). The role of immigrant and ethnic communities on the
political landscape of New York City had not dulled in 2009 at the time of the Great
Recession and the signing of ARRA into law. “At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
immigrants from the Dominican Republic, China, Mexico, and Jamaica were the top four
immigrant groups, but there were substantial numbers from other Latin American, Asian,
and Caribbean countries as well as from Europe and, in recent years, from Africa, too. In
fact, in 2010, the four largest groups were only a little over a third of all foreign born, and
no other country accounted for more than 5 percent (Foner, 2014).” Or, as stated by
Mollenkopf (2014), and quoted at length:

Unlike Newark, Detroit, or St. Louis, New York City did not become more black
- or even more native minority - as it became less white. Instead, it received a
growing number of immigrants from all racial backgrounds. By 2009, whites
remained a third of the city’s population, but mainly because immigrants from
the Soviet Union bolstered the total.
In 2009, according to the Central Population Survey (CPS), some three
million of New York City’s 8.3 million residents were foreign born and another
two million were their children. People living in immigrant families made up
almost three-fifths of the city’s residents, almost half its voting-age citizens,
and two-fifths of its actual voters… The group that has long dominated New
York City politics, native born whites with native parents, now make up less
than one-fifth of the city’s population, although in 2008 they contributed a
quarter of eligible voters and almost a third of those actually casting ballots.
This has made assembling a city-wide electoral majority ever more
challenging. To be sure, racial polarization (whites versus nonwhites) has
played an important role in all mayoral elections between 1989 and 2009. The
overwhelming Democratic advantage in voter registration should have meant
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that party allegiance would have enabled Democratic nominees to win citywide
elections. In these mayoral races, however, enough white (and other)
Democrats were willing to defect from Democratic candidates who were
members of minority groups or received substantial support from them that
Republican candidates won all the mayoral elections after the Dinkins victory in
1989. Still, because native immigrant-origin white voters were no longer a
majority of the electorate after 2000, white candidates could note use racial
polarization as an effective strategy for assembling an electoral majority.
Instead, they needed some cross-group coalition formation.

Later in this paper, we will explore the coalitions that were present in 2009 as the Great
Recession took hold and the shift in those political coalitions that led to the first election of a
Democratic mayor in twenty years, as occurred with the election of Bill de Blasio in 2013. As
part of that examination, the background from political coalition theory and urban regime
politics will provide a good measure of observation, allowing a picture to be drawn of
political coalitions present during the contentious mayoral election of 2009, amidst the
political upheaval created by the extension of term limits not only for the mayor’s office but
for city council members. The political environment stemming from this decision and
reaffirmation of the two term limit in 2010 set the stage for the shifting political balance in
2013 between centrist, party-backed candidates in the Democratic primary, and the rise of
emerging candidates for the mayor’s office. These political events operated in the shadows
of the Great Recession, and played out in specific form on the streets of Brooklyn, as
neighborhoods shifted political allegiance, and new political coalitions were formed, at the
same time that the greatest influx of unanticipated funding from the federal government
was reaching businesses and organizations throughout the borough.
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Why Brooklyn

Brooklyn provides a good measure of the distributive qualities of federal funding from ARRA
and the potential influence of urban regime politics in New York City for a number of
reasons. First, unlike Manhattan with its global financial institutions and international
corporate centers that influence federal legislation, businesses and organizations in Brooklyn
sought ARRA funding on much the same level-ground as other municipalities around the
country. Brooklyn has no Wall Street, which not incidentally received its own federal bailout
in 2008 and 2009, and no Midtown corporate service environment with lobbying arms that
extend to Senate and House offices in Washington. In short, the competition begins on a
more even plane and is subject to the political influences that compete at the neighborhood
level.
Brooklyn has a history of Democratic politics built around neighborhood ethnic
dynamics, traditional Democratic Party control, and the influence of a growing liberal
Democratic constituency. In 2009, it had an emerging liberal/labor political arm in the
Working Families Party and a traditional Democratic machine that, though weakened, still
exerted great authority in sections of the borough. In time, that liberal/labor arm under the
Working Families Party would emerge as a political force that helped to shape the
constituency of Bill de Blasio’s run for mayor in 2013. Brooklyn also includes ethnic
constituencies whose loyalties are sought-after in election years. The Jewish vote in
Borough Park, Midwood, and Crown Heights, and the Hassidic communities in southern
Williamsburg are often central to success in borough-wide elections. Brooklyn has an
established and politically active African-American population in Fort Greene, Clinton Hill,
and Bedford-Stuyvesant. It has a fast-growing population of Dominicans, Haitians, and
other Caribbean ethnic groups emerging as a political force in Flatbush, Wingate,
Brownsville, and East New York. A large Mexican-American population lives in Sunset Park,
Red Hook, and a growing Latin population is developing in eastern portions of the borough.
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Brooklyn also has established, if now more isolated, populations of conservative Democrats
in white ethnic neighborhoods across the borough. Italian and Irish neighborhoods in Bay
Ridge, Carroll Gardens, Bensonhurst, Kensington, and Gravesend hold traditional political
power in the borough. White ethnics also comprise much of the recent immigrant population
with communities of Russian and Eastern European immigrants in Brighton Beach, Coney
Island, and Sheepshead Bay. Lastly, a politically active population of liberal Democrats
centers the borough in Park Slope, Cobble Hill, and parts of Windsor Terrace. This ethnic
heterogeneity and political influence centered within specific neighborhoods creates a
competitive, and ever-shifting, political atmosphere in citywide and council elections.

Mayoral electoral map: Brooklyn (pre-2009 to 2013)

The electoral coalition that elected Michael Bloomberg in 2001 and 2005 stands in sharp
contrast from the one that persisted through the controversial election of 2009. Bloomberg
expended considerable amounts of his personal wealth to achieve the public-facing image
that catapulted him from successful entrepreneur turned billionaire turned philanthropist
into one of the most successful political runs in recent mayoral history in New York. His
electoral coalition stretched out from Manhattan to the boroughs building on a responsive
electorate in populations within Brooklyn that had helped to elect Republican after
Republican mayor since 1993 from the end of the Dinkins administration to the onset of the
Giuliani administration. In 2005, Bloomberg was reelected in the contest with Democrat
Fernando Ferrer with key constituencies in Democratic-leaning Brooklyn coming to show
their support for the Republican mayor. Traditionally Latino areas of Brooklyn came out to
support the former Bronx borough president, Ferrer, who is of Puerto Rican descent, and
Bloomberg struggled to win votes in areas like Sunset Park and Bushwick. Ferrer had lost
the 2001 Democratic primary in part because he was not able to capture the black vote in
Brooklyn, and in 2005, though Bloomberg was outpaced by Ferrer in black neighborhoods,
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Bloomberg still pulled in surprising levels of support from predominately black communities,
including Brownsville (41.4%), Bedford-Stuyvesant (42.3%), and the assembly districts
covering Crown Heights, Clinton Hill, and Fort Greene (44.7%), though those areas were
boosted by Jewish-American votes in those districts.
Bloomberg strongholds in Brooklyn in the 2005 election included the assembly
districts that covered areas with large white ethnic populations, Democrats that often fled
the party for Republicans when ethnic minorities were nominated in the Democratic
primary, areas like Gravesend (83.6%), Coney Island, Brighton Beach, and Bath Beach
(73.7%), and Bensonhurst (77.1%). More so, Bloomberg established a base in Jewish
neighborhoods throughout Brooklyn seeing strong support in Borough Park (78.7%),
Midwood (84.6%), and Jewish sections of Williamsburg.
The picture for Bloomberg in Brooklyn changed considerably in 2009, facing not only
resentment from the change in term limits but also a new opponent, comptroller Bill
Thompson. Thompson, an African American, had appeal in the borough that diluted any
support that Bloomberg had in traditionally black neighborhoods in the city. Bloomberg
faced a precipitous fall in support in key areas like Brownsville - falling from 41.4% to
15.4% of the vote; Bedford-Stuyvesant - from 42.3% to 15.7%; Crown Heights, Clinton
Hill, Fort Greene - from 44.7% to 23.3%; and in Flatbush/East Flatbush - from 50.1% to
18.7%. Bloomberg also saw a decline in white liberal neighborhoods like Park Slope and
Prospect Heights. But in key areas of the borough, the Bloomberg election coalition held,
specifically in Jewish-American areas and the white ethnic neighborhoods, including
Gravesend (81.0%), Bensonhurst (73.7%), Midwood (72.6%), parts of Borough Park
(69.9%), and Bay Ridge (NYC Board of Elections, 2005, 2009).
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Table 1.1 | Mayoral Vote by Neighborhood by Election (2005, 2009)
Assembly
District

Neighborhood

40

Vote-Mayor2005 (by AD)

Vote-Mayor2009 (by AD)

45.10%

22.60%

41

Marine Park

68.70%

52.80%

42

Flatbush

52.20%

32.60%

43

Flatbush, Crown Heights

51.70%

23.60%

44

Park Slope, Prospect Heights

62.60%

54.90%

45

Gravesend

83.60%

81.00%

46

Coney Island, Brighton Beach, Bath
Beach

73.70%

69.20%

47

Bensonhurst

77.10%

73.70%

48

Midwood

84.60%

72.60%

49

Borough Park

78.70%

69.90%

50

Williamsburg

59.00%

44.00%

51

Sunset Park

39.60%

45.90%

52

Downtown Brooklyn

58.90%

54.00%

53

Bushwick

26.40%

40.00%

54

Cypress Hills

32.40%

26.30%

55

Brownsville

41.40%

15.40%

56

Bedford-Stuyvesant

42.30%

15.70%

57

Crown Heights, Clinton Hill, Fort Greene

44.70%

23.30%

58

Flatbush, East Flatbush

50.10%

18.70%

59

Marine Park

69.80%

48.30%

60

East New York/Howard Beach

74.60%

65.70%

58.20%

45.10%

All Brooklyn
(NYC Board of Elections, 2005, 2009)

The Bloomberg political coalition - or more pointedly, one that had extended from 2001 to
2009, a coalition supported by white ethnics, featuring particularly strong support in Jewish
neighborhoods, as well as Italian and Irish sections of the city - had weakened with the
effort to extend term limits. The weakened areas of the coalition, specifically among white
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liberals and the evaporation of support from traditionally black neighborhoods, set up the
potential for the Democrats to regain Gracie Mansion in the following election.
The early years of the recovery from the Great Recession were not ones of political
triumph for Bloomberg and no Republican successor was to be crowned. Groups most
affected by the recession, be it those employed in manufacturing and other blue-collar
professions, to those that saw the promise of home ownership disappear in neighborhoods
that only ten years earlier had seen the first generation, often a first generation of
Americans, establish themselves as property owners in heavily immigrant and emerging
neighborhoods of Brooklyn.
Not since Dinkins won in 1989 had there been as much optimism for the Democratic
Party to capture the mayor’s office with a progressive candidate. Emerging in the
Democratic primary of 2013 were Christine Quinn, council speaker; Bill Thompson, looking
to rebound from his loss to Bloomberg in 2009; John Lui, the rising star in Queens; and Bill
de Blasio, public advocate and darling of the Working Families Party that was making a
major push to support left-leaning candidates who would challenge machine candidates tied
to borough establishment politics.
Brooklyn was home turf for de Blasio - Quinn was established in Manhattan; Lui in
Queens - the biggest threat to de Blasio, after Anthony Weiner had left the contest under
controversy, was Bill Thompson, and the threat to an electoral coalition that needed support
in black constituencies across the borough. Ultimately, de Blasio would only win Brooklyn
with 46.4% of the primary vote, but go-on to win the borough in the general election with
77.5% of the vote, outpacing Bloomberg’s performance in 2009 by 32%. Where Bloomberg
saw the largest fall-off in support in Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Crown Heights
and Flatbush, de Blasio was able to hold off Thompson by an average of 50% to 33% in key
areas of his electoral base (NYC Board of Elections, 2013). The Bloomberg strongholds of
2009, particularly in the Jewish neighborhoods of Borough Park, parts of Williamsburg, and
in white ethnic areas in Bensonhurst, Midwood, Coney Island, and Gravesend did not
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migrate to de Blasio, and instead set aside Thompson, who they had passed on in 2009, to
either split the vote or shift in favor of John Lui, the only areas of Brooklyn in which de
Blasio was not able to maintain a plurality of the vote in the primary.

Table 1.2 | Mayoral Vote by Neighborhood by Election (2009, 2013)
Assembly
District

Neighborhood(s)

VoteMayor2009 (by
AD)

Vote-BdBDemPrim
(2013)

VoteDemPrimRival
(2013)

VoteMayor2013

41

Marine Park

52.80%

38.10%

31.8% BT

58.50%

42

Flatbush

32.60%

50.10%

29.3% BT

84.60%

43

Flatbush, Crown Heights

23.60%

50.10%

32.5% BT

92.90%

44

Park Slope, Prospect Heights

54.90%

57.00%

16.2% CQ

73.50%

45

Gravesend

81.00%

25.80%

22.2% BT

36.20%

46

Coney Island, Brighton Beach,
Bath Beach

69.20%

35.40%

23.8% BT

48.50%

47

Bensonhurst

73.70%

25.60%

31.9% JL

52.10%

48

Midwood

72.60%

38.00%

34.0% BT

39.10%

49

Borough Park

69.90%

26.90%

36.9% JL

54.50%

50

Williamsburg

44.00%

45.20%

38.4% BT

79.00%

51

Sunset Park

45.90%

48.20%

16.6% BT

80.80%

52

Downtown Brooklyn

54.00%

56.60%

26.2% CQ

80.30%

53

Bushwick

40.00%

31.80%

25.8% BT

90.80%

54

Cypress Hills

26.30%

35.80%

34.7% BT

94.70%

55

Brownsville

15.40%

43.90%

34.5% BT

97.50%

56

Bedford-Stuyvesant

15.70%

45.30%

37.2% BT

97.00%

57

Crown Heights, Clinton Hill,
Fort Greene

23.30%

54.70%

24.1% BT

94.50%

58

Flatbush, East Flatbush

18.70%

52.40%

33.0% BT

97.80%

59

Marine Park

48.30%

45.60%

33.5% BT

75.10%

60

East New York/Howard Beach

65.70%

46.70%

34.0% BT

96.50%

64

Bay Ridge

36.00%

21.7% CQ

49.00%

46.40%

n/a

77.50%

All
Brooklyn

45.10%

(NYC Board of Elections, 2009, 2013)

18

The general election in 2013 reestablished a Democratic coalition that fell along more
traditional lines, or at least more traditional in terms of expectations prior to the
unprecedented run of Republican mayors from 1993 to 2013. In Brooklyn, de Blasio saw
massive swings in traditionally black and immigrant neighborhoods where he had already
out-paced Thompson in the primary. Throughout Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Crown
Heights, Flatbush and East Flatbush, de Blasio received greater than 90% and in many
cases greater than 95% of the general election vote. Specific to de Blasio’s success was the
support from the electorate aligned to the Working Families Party line, a line and political
effort that had originally propelled him into the public advocate’s office. The Working
Families Party line accounted for 5.1% of his votes in Brooklyn, but were instrumental in
key geographic strongholds in Park Slope/Prospect Heights (11.2%), downtown Brooklyn
(12.9%), and Clinton Hill/Fort Greene (9.6%), and labor-backing centers in Sunset Park and
Williamsburg (NYC Board of Elections, 2013). Only traditionally native white ethnic
communities, fueled by more conservative Italian, Irish and Jewish communities, held out in
what was otherwise a dominating electoral outcome in the borough for the Democratic
candidate.

The economic climate and federal funding in the New York City budget (20012008)

The Great Recession and the economic stimulus funding that followed provides a
unique moment in the history of federal funding in the city. Functioning under the political
landscape of New York City is the largest economic center by concentration in the United
States with an annual budget that exceeds the budgets of all but five states. From 2009 to
2018, the New York City budget grew from $59.373 billion to $85.239 billion and federal
funding grew from just over $5 billion before the Great Recession to $7.8 billion in 2018.
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The influx of money in 2009, on the heels of the economic disaster that became the Great
Recession, saw an immediate rise in federal funding as a percentage of the total city budget
that was unprecedented in recent history. The result was a rise in federal funding in FY 2010
that was $2.630 billion more than the estimated total of funding from the federal
government, a 49.5% increase over expectations. (Thompson, 2008; Liu, 2010; Stringer,
2017).
The federal stimulus, much like the Great Recession, was unanticipated as part of the
original budget and forecasting efforts by the city. Bill Thompson, NYC comptroller in 2008,
reported in his office’s annual executive summary that, “the adopted budget for FY 2008
and FYs 2008-2011 Financial Plan reflect the benefits of the City economy’s strong
performance and prudent fiscal management.” The only hint of concern: “While we agree
with the City that that local economic growth will follow the lead of the slowing national
economy, the Comptroller’s Office expects that the local housing market will not soften as
much as the City’s forecast suggests [a prediction that did not stand the test of time, as
noted in Chart 1]… One note of caution surrounding higher revenues is concern that
stresses to the credit and equity markets emanating from problems with sub-prime loans
could intensify and decrease Wall Street profits” (Thompson, 2008). Perhaps because of
these tepid warnings, no change was made to the forecast for federal funding for years
2008-2011, remaining steady at $5.2 billion to $5.3 billion annually in each year between
2008 and 2011.
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The 2009 report, again by Comptroller Thompson, sheds some (but not all) of the
optimism for New York City to weather the economic storm that was brewing across the
nation. “In the midst of the weak and uncertain local and national economies… Although the
Comptroller does not expect the present slowdown to be as disastrous for New York City’s
workforce as were the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions… the economic projections of the
Comptroller’s Office are less pessimistic than those of the Executive Budget…” (Thompson,
2009). Projections for federal funds for NYC remained unchanged in the 2009 annual report,
holding steady at $5.3 billion per year for the entire forecast.
By the time John Liu had become Comptroller, the forecast had changed considerably
as had the tone: “A year ago at this time, the U.S. economy was in the midst of one of its
steepest contractions since WWII and there was little certainty of where the bottom would
be found. Since then, however, the outlook has improved considerably, thanks to
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unprecedented actions by the federal government and the natural resiliency of the American
economy… A significant portion of the Federal grants assumption represents stimulus
funding that the City expects to receive under ARRA of 2009.” One need only look at the
federal funds support for the Department of Education (DOE) to see the baseline effect – in
FY 2010, federal funding accounted for $1.194 billion of the NYC DOE budget, another
projected $853 million in FY2011, before falling off completely as ARRA funding ran its
course.
Table 1.3 | ARRA Federal Stimulus Funds, Projections FYs 2009-2013
($ in millions)

Functional Area
Community Development
Education

FY
2009

FY
2010

FY
2011

FY
2012

FY
2013

Total

$0

$48

$0

$0

$0

$48

0

1,194

853

0

0

$2,047

Health and Social Services

28

207

39

0

0

$274

Neighborhood Stabilization

47

72

21

5

0

$145

Economic/Workforce Development

1

60

4

0

0

$65

Build America/NYCTFA Bonds

0

16

62

64

64

$206

Other

0

68

90

25

7

$190

Total Expense Budget Support

$75

$1,665

$1,070

$94

$71

$2,975

FMAP Medicaid Relief

$459

$663

$856

$395

$422

$2,795

Total ARRA Support

$534

$2,328

$1,926

$489

$493

$5,770

(Lui, 2011)

In this time, federal funding forecasts shifted dramatically to $8.193 billion in FY
2010 and a projected $6.691 billion in FY 2011 before returning to more traditional
baselines of previous budget forecasts. These shifts reflect an increase of funding from the
federal government of over 54% in FY 2010 and 26% in FY 2011.
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Table 1.4 | Comptroller Estimated Federal Categorical Grants, FYs 2009 - 2013
($ in millions)
FY
2009

FY
2010

FY
2011

Thompson, 2008

$5,380

$5,364

$5,351

Thompson, 2009

$5,395

$5,313

$5,303

$5,313

$8,193

$6,691

$5,690

-0.95%

-0.90%

54.21%

26.17%

Projection

Lui, 2011
Difference Projection '08 to '09

0.28%

Difference Projection '09 to '11

FY
2012

FY
2013

$5,640

7.10%

(Thompson, 2008; Thompson, 2009; Lui, 2011)

The unprecedented increase in federal funding served to offset key losses from tax revenues
and state contributions to the city budget. But those grants were not the only means of
funding that reached Brooklyn. As we will see in the next section, the Small Business
Administration also provided grants and loans to individuals, businesses, and organizations,
which no longer had access to traditional credit markets in the wake of the Recession.

The distribution of ARRA federal funds in Brooklyn, NY

ARRA funds came into Brooklyn in the forms of Loans, Grants, and Contracts. Each took an
important role in an economic recovery, and each served a different political capacity.

Loans, Small Business Administration
Loans, administered almost exclusively by the Small Business Administration, provided
access to credit that was otherwise unavailable as credit granting financial institutions
closed or moved to a protectionist position. Loans, ranging from aid to small businesses
($10,000 - $50,000) to more lucrative long-term financing ($150,000 - $1,000,000+),
entered the borough but provided little in contributed capital that aligned with the political
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coalitions competing for Brooklyn. Examples of larger loans in the borough include the
following.

TABLE 1.5 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Large Loans
Recipient

Assembly Member/ Council
Member

Neighborhood

Funding ($)

Clairion Inn & Suites

Park Slope

Millman/de Blasio

$1,539,000

New York Glass, Co.

Sunset Park

Ortiz/Gonzalez

$1,500,000

Midwood Dialysis, LLC

Midwood

Brennan/Felder

$1,350,000

Hi-Rite Electric Corp.

Bay Ridge

Ortiz/Gentile

$989,000

(Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov)

Of greater importance are the number of grants that were issued to organizations within in
the borough. Grants came from a variety of agencies in the administration, including the
Education Department, the Energy Department, Housing and Urban Development, Health
and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and smaller grants from the National Endowment for
the Arts. The grants ranged in purpose: educational grant programs, low-income housing
funds, capital construction projects in the health services industry, and job retention funds
as part of the Obama administration’s efforts to “save or create” jobs in the failing
economy.

Grants, Education and Energy Departments
The vast majority of education department grants (and energy department grants
promoting energy efficiency) in Brooklyn went to two sources: major universities or colleges
and Jewish schools and community centers. The private colleges and for-profit universities
in Brooklyn received a number of significant funds for capital improvements and other
operations. They include:
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Table 1.6 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Universities and Colleges
Recipient

Neighborhood

Assembly Member/
Council Member

Funding ($)

Long Island University Hospital

Downtown Brooklyn

Millman/de Blasio

$377,349

St. Francis College

Downtown Brooklyn

Millman/Yassky

$1,137,739

Brooklyn Law College

Downtown Brooklyn

Millman/Yassky

$209,571

Pratt Institute

Clinton Hill

Jeffries/James

$1,206,588

St. Joseph's College

Clinton Hill

Jeffries/James

$1,436,921

ASA Institute of Business

Downtown Brooklyn

Millman/Yassky

$6,068,451

(Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov)

Additionally, Jewish schools received an unexpectedly large number of federal grants for
schools across Bloomberg strongholds in Borough Park, Midwood, Williamsburg and parts of
Flatbush. Also noteworthy, no other faith-based schools received ARRA funding in Brooklyn
as reported on recovery.gov, including no direct funding to the Roman Catholic, Eastern or
Russian Orthodox dioceses of Brooklyn (exception: ARRA funding directed to Catholic
colleges & universities noted above), Muslim madrassas, or Protestant-affiliated schools.
Distribution of federal funds do not have a direct line from Gracie Mansion, but the number
of Jewish community centers and schools that received funding maps against the
concentration of political power for Mayor Bloomberg during the 2009 election. The collapse
of support for Bloomberg in black and white liberal areas of the borough required his
campaign to maximize the potential from key constituencies that remained part of his
coalition, none perhaps more important than the Jewish communities that were served by
the community centers receiving a substantial portion of ARRA funds in the borough.

Examples of ARRA funding directed toward Jewish community centers and schools include
the following.
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Table 1.7 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Jewish Community
Centers and Schools
Recipient

Neighborhood

Assembly Member/
Council Member

Funding ($)

Crown Heights Jewish Center

Crown Heights

Jeffries/James

$4,004,547

Mestiva Torah Vodaath Seminary

Park Slope

Brennan/de Blasio

Mirrer Yeshiva Center

Sheepshead Bay

Cymbrowitz/Nelson

$178,543

Beth Hatalmud Rabbinical

Bensonhurst

Colton/Recchia

$249,543

Merkaz BNOS

Bensonhurst

Colton/Recchia

$673,637

Mesitva of Eastern Parkway

East Flatbush

Perry/Mealy

Associated Beth Rivkan

Crown Heights

Camara/James

$140,000

Rabbinical College

Bedford-Stuyvesant

Robinson/Vann

$407,681

Yeshiva Kehilath Yakoe

Williamsburg

Lentol/Yassky

$49,451

Khal Beni Emunim Talmud

Williamsburg

Lentol/Yassky

$527,916

Kehilath Ykov Rabinnical Sem

Williamsburg

Lentol/Yassky

$138,151

United Talmudical Academy

Williamsburg

Lentol/Yassky

$1,959,169

Congregation Adas Yereim

Williamsburg

Lentol/Yassky

$68,695

Yeshiva of Nitra

Williamsburg

Lentol/Yassky

$367,363

$94,137

$34,077

(Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov)

Grants, Housing & Urban Development and Health & Human Services Grants
The federal grants through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
Health and Human Services (HHS) came largely through Community Development Block
Grants administered within neighborhoods. In contrast to the flow of money to Jewish
schools and community centers, often relatively smaller sums directed at political forces
with smaller, finite geographical influence, the block grants served through large community
organizations played a different political role. These grants were received by organizations
like Ridgewood-Bushwick, once purveyor of the politics of Vito Lopez, Brooklyn Democratic
Party boss.
The larger community development organizations exercised a political aim, reinforcing
the notion that funding streams entered the borough from the federal government both to
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constituencies in favor of Bloomberg’s reelection and to those that had shifted support to
Thompson. Examples of ARRA funds flowing into these organizations include the following.

Table 1.8 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Community Development Organizations
Recipient

Federal Agency

Funding ($)

Ridgewood-Bushwick Senior Citizens Council

HUD

$1,566,747

Kingston Ave Development LLC

HUD

$2,092,818

Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corp

HUD

$8,838,955

Classon Heights LLC

HUD

$1,573,200

Bushwick Avenue Associates

HUD

$366,000

ODA Community Development Corp

HUD

$10,215,781

Brooklyn Chinese American Association

HUD

$431,129

Sunset Park Health Center

HUD

$3,566,526

Mother Zion Apartments

HUD

$1,083,225

Towne Gardens LLC

HUD

$1,987,456

Brownsville Community Development

HUD

$1,079,672

Greene Ave HDFC

HUD

$1,591,031

Bedford-Stuyvesant Health Center

HUD

$1,112,200

Camba

HUD

$5,689,000

Riverdale Osborne Towers Housing

HUD

$1,493,506

(Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov)

This is not to suggest a causal relationship between HUD grants and political organizations
with a political end. Indeed, many of these bring federal dollars to community development
and low-income housing projects drastically in need of funding. However, these public
housing initiatives have a political element to them that cannot be mistaken. Funding for
these institutions has political consequences and additional funding from the federal
government is no exception.
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Shovel-Ready or Rent-Seeking: Uniqueness and Success Measures of Recipient
Beneficiaries of Federal Funds under ARRA

Ultimately, ARRA will be measured on its achievement of its policy goals: namely, to
preserve and create jobs. To that end, the question of whether program recipients fit the
description of “shovel-ready” – recipients that would utilize federal investment (either grant
or loans) to create demand through increased production, innovation, or consumption –
requires additional analysis. If Kingdon’s measure prevails, political entrepreneurs would
have succeeded in diverting federal funds towards a “rent-seeking” model fueling political
gamesmanship more than economic growth.
One measure of the uniqueness of ARRA funding is reflected in the number of
businesses that received ARRA funds but were not part of discretionary funding after ARRA
was fully distributed. Essentially, were recipients common receivers of federal funds, or
were they unique to funding from the discretionary budget controlled by the city? Of the
ninety-one (91) business and organizations that this study addresses, twenty (20) were
recipients of discretionary funds from the city after 2009. The character of those twenty
recipients is worth examining. Essentially, four categories of recipients prevailed with
additional funding in the years after ARRA, large public/private institutions, communitybased programs, economic development agencies, and Jewish congregations.
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Table 1.9 | Persistent Beneficiaries of Discretionary Funding, post-ARRA
Large Institutions
(Public/Private)

Community-Based
Programs

Economic
Development
Corporations

Jewish
Congregations &
Schools

Brooklyn Chinese
Association

Brooklyn Youth
Chorus

North Flatbush
Housing

Merkaz BNOS

Long Island College
Hospital

Reel Stories Teen
Filmmaking

Cambra Economic
Development

Rabbinical College

Brooklyn Public
Library

Groundswell
Community Mural

Brownsville
Community
Development

United Talmudical
Academy

Brooklyn Botanic
Gardens

Restore Housing
Development

Congregation Adas
Yereim

Pratt Institute

Greene Ave HFDC

Brooklyn Plaza
Medical Center
St. Francis College
NYC College of
Technology

The majority of the recipients of federal funds were not repeat receivers and provided a
spectrum of available recipients from dry cleaners to restauranteurs, start-ups, and wellestablished programs. The term “shovel-ready” leaves a lot to be desired from a policy
point-of-view – do established businesses have more infrastructure to take advantage of
new funding to convert it into job-creating or job-saving investments; or, do established
businesses seek federal funds to service debt at low rates? Are entrepreneurs who took
advantage of federal funding under ARRA good bets for the economy or unnecessary risks
that won’t contribute to the economy once the funding dries up?
A look at the recipients of ARRA funds in Brooklyn based on their years of
establishment provides another view into how funds were distributed to businesses and
organizations within the borough (via Dun & Bradstreet Business Browser and Resource USA

29

databases). The stimulus reached institutions established as early as 1884 (St. Francis
College) and 1887 (Pratt Institute) and 1897 (Brooklyn Public Library). It reached small
business established after the Great Recession in 2008 (A to Z Daycare) and 2010 (Citywide
Dental) that used small business loans to establish their business. The measure of success
of ARRA cannot be limited to a view of 2009, but must take into account the funding that
allowed businesses to establish themselves in the years that followed. Overall, as examined
through the Dun & Bradstreet and Resource USA databases, fifty-one (51) of the ninety-one
(91) recipients were registered in their databases with information showing a range of
receivers from post-2007 (10), 2000-2006 (7), 1990-1999 (12), 1950-1989 (14), and pre1949 (10). This range of recipients suggests that distribution was driven by business
entrepreneurs and established institutions experienced at seeking funding sources from the
federal government.
Lastly, performance of ARRA recipients has not lived up to the transparency that was
promised in the original legislation. The website, recovery.gov, was shut down, replaced in
part by USAspending.gov, but which still did not list whether loan-recipients had repaid their
loans. Economic performance tracks some indicators but provides an incomplete picture:
economic/business databases show some signs of progress, but are inconclusive, as selfreported data into each database is difficult to confirm with secondary evidence.
Nonetheless, the data available show a picture of progress and the limitations that a single
moment of funding can have on small business development in a competitive marketplace
like New York City.
Companies that reported growth from 2009 to 2018 through Resources USA included
ARRA recipients like Hi-Rite Electric (9.7% increase in net revenue), Maximum Security
Systems (90.3%), Lee Trading Company (75.3%), and Volmar Construction (12.5%), but in
every case the revenue increases were outside the years 2009-2011, and therefore provide
less evidence of correlation between ARRA funding and increased revenue. Did ARRA bridge
a troubled time? Did ARRA allow for the business that otherwise might have closed to
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remain open? Certainly that is possible, but being that much of the revenue gains appear
later, it appears that ARRA was more effective in its mission to save jobs than to create
jobs.
At the same time, a number of businesses fell-off in revenue in the years after ARRA
funding, namely NYC Glass (-54.7%), JEM Smoke (-79.8%), Lugh Studios (-39.3%), and
Soltone, Inc. (-71.6%), the restaurant company having used the federal loan to open a
second restaurant location in Park Slope that would close not long after opening. Perhaps
revealing, according to each database, two of the companies that started after the
Recession saw declines in revenue after 2011, A to Z Daycare and Citywide Dental, though
the declines were not precipitous.

Overlays of federal funding and electoral coalition strength

The overlay of federal funding against the diminishing electoral coalition of Michael
Bloomberg’s candidacy in Brooklyn in 2009 does not present a causal relationship between
federal funding and his electoral coalition. However, certain patterns do appear, namely,
more so than others, the nexus of his campaign’s reliance on Jewish support from the
borough as he anticipated a precipitous drop in support in neighborhoods that didn’t align to
Fernando Ferrer in 2005, but were likely to support Bill Thompson in 2009. Furthermore, as
few of those key recipients went on to receive discretionary funding from the city in the
years after ARRA, those one-time allocations to key recipients in election constituencies
further support the correlation of funding with much-needed political support. Lastly, the
nature of the recipients, community centers and schools that have broad influence on their
communities, especially noting that community centers of other faiths did not have the
same representation, further indicates that political motivations, however consequential,
were realized in the benefit of federal funds being directed to key elements of the
Bloomberg election coalition that remained in Brooklyn.
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Concluding Remarks

The Great Recession, the federal government’s response with the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the coinciding election of Michael Bloomberg to a third term
as mayor presented a unique moment to examine a major city at the crossroads of
economic disaster and political upheaval.
The Great Recession reached every part of the nation’s economy and no city, not
even the epicenter of the American economy in New York City, was spared. Though the city
weathered the economic shock of the Recession differently than other locations, aspects of
the effects that reached the city are both representative of those that affected regions
elsewhere and provided a unique view into how economic factors affect a city in political
flux. New York City’s immigrant and ethnic-based politics posed an opportunity to examine
how the effect of economic disaster and political change reach and breach political coalitions
across the city.
Ultimately, this study looks to contribute to the developing literature on the
expenditure of ARRA funds during the Great Recession. Unlike other research that has either
focused on national distribution of ARRA funds (Benjamin, 2017), implementation
constraints (Carley & Hyman, 2014), or the adherence of distribution to politically consistent
aims (Young & Sobel, 2013), the work developed in this study is more consistent with the
questions developed by Gimpel (2012), asking whether ARRA became “a vehicle for a broad
array of policy goals as political entrepreneurs took advantage of an especially wide-open
window of opportunity.” The analysis suggests the conditions were not only present but the
allocation of funds consistent and aligned to key constituencies in Bloomberg’s reelection
efforts in the tumultuous campaign of 2009. To that end, this study contributes to existent
literature on ARRA by linking ARRA policy studies with the literature on urban political
coalitions, to examine at the local, even the neighborhood level, how public budgeting under
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extraordinary times play out during elections years, few as exceptional as the race for New
York City mayor in 2009.
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